This paper characterizes a class of rules for decision-making when an agent knows the possible states of the world and the outcome of each of her actions for each state, but does not have any information about the probabilities of the states. The existing literature in this framework has mainly considered `max'-based or `min'-based rules and their variants. Such rules reflect rather extreme forms of optimism or pessimism on the part of an agent. In contrast, this paper focuses on the median outcome(s) and characterizes a class of decision-making rules, which reflects a more `balanced' attitude towards uncertainty. 
Introduction
This paper characterizes a class of rules for decision-making under the type of nonprobabilistic uncertainty considered first by Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) . Under this type of uncertainty, the agent knows different possible states of the world and the outcome of each of her actions for each state, but does not have any probabilistic information, such as exact probabilities, the likelihood ranking 1 , or probability intervals 2 for these states. Following Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) , several writers (see, for example, Maskin (1979) , Barrett and Pattanaik (1984) , and Barbera and Jackson (1988) ), have discussed different rules of decision-making under uncertainty of the Arrow-Hurwicz type. All these contributions, however, focus on "max"-based or "min"-based rules and variants of such rules. In light of the agent"s usually limited capacity for processing information, it seems intuitively plausible to assume that an agent, when confronted with the problem of choice under uncertainty, may concentrate on some "focal" outcomes 3 for each action. It is, however, not clear why the agent will necessarily look only at the extreme outcomes, i.e., the best or worst outcomes, of each action. An alternative focal point for each action may be its median outcome(s)
4
. The ranking of actions on the basis of their extreme outcomes involves excessive optimism or pessimism on the part of the agent. In contrast, the focus on the median outcome(s) in ranking alternative actions can be interpreted as a characteristic of more balanced behavior. Though decision rules based on the median outcome(s) seem to have considerable intuitive plausibility, the structure of these rules in the Arrow-Hurwicz framework has not been explored so far. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by providing an axiomatic characterization of a class of median-based decision rules for choice under non-probabilistic uncertainty of the Arrow-Hurwicz type
5
.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce the basic notation and assumptions. Section 3 presents the axioms with illustrative examples. The main result and its 1 See Kelsey (1986) for a discussion of decision-making when the agent has only the likelihood ranking of the states, but not their exact probabilities. 2 See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for a model of decision-making where the agent has a probability interval for each state of the world. 3 The idea that the agent may consider only some focal outcomes of each available action goes back to Milnor (1954) and Shackle (1954) . It may be worth recalling that the paper of Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) was published in a volume in honor of Shackle. 4 For a precise definition of the median outcome(s) of an action, see Section 2 below. 5 Nitzan and Pattanaik (1984) characterize a class of median-based decision rules in a framework which was first introduced by Kannai and Peleg (1984) , and which is very different from that of Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) . Nitzan and Pattanaik, (1984) , as well as Kannai and Peleg (1984) , do not introduce the states of the world into their model, they assume that the agent knows only the set of outcomes for each action.
3 proof are given in section 4. Section 5 contains an example of a median-based rule. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Notation and Assumptions
Assumption 2.1. The universal set of outcomes, X, is a non-empty and convex subset of
where n is some fixed positive integer.
Assumption 2.2. The agent has a convex ordering over X, such that for some , x y X  , xy and not ( yx ).
The asymmetric and symmetric factors of are given by and , respectively. Let
A decision problem is defined by a (finite) non-empty set of states of the world, s. Let Z be the class of all decision problems and let the elements of Z be denoted by ,, S S S   etc. Given As noted earlier, actions for any given decision problem with m states of the world can be thought of as mn  vectors of real numbers. Therefore, continuity of the agent"s ordering over A(S) can be defined in the usual fashion. 7 If there are more than one way of indexing the outcomes in this fashion, we choose one of them and keep it fixed. We choose the indexing of outcomes, such that, 
The Axioms
We shall now introduce several plausible properties that the agent may satisfy. The properties are also illustrated with examples. We shall later characterize median-based rules in terms of these properties.
Axiom 3.1. Neutrality: Suppose ,
there exists a one-to-one function f from S to S such that, for all ,
Suppose two decision problems S and S have equal number of the states of the world. Neutrality then requires that, if the ranking of outcomes from two actions a and b, in decision problem S is "analogous" to the ranking of the outcomes of two actions a and b , in the decision problem S , then the ranking of a and b will be similar to Neutrality has several plausible implications that have been discussed in the literature for decision-making under complete uncertainty. First, neutrality implies that the identities of the states of a decision problem do not matter while ranking actions in a decision problem; only order of the outcomes under different states matters. Thus, neutrality is similar to the well-known "symmetry" axiom introduced by Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) , but it is stronger than the "symmetry" axiom. The "symmetry" axiom as discussed in Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) requires the image set of the mapping from one decision problem to the other to be identical with the domain set, whereas, the image set can be different than the domain set under neutrality.
Second, neutrality implies that, while ranking two actions, only the ranking of outcomes from these two actions are relevant. The ranking of outcomes, at least one of which does not occur in the two actions under consideration, is of no importance. This may be noted as "Independence of the Irrelevant Outcomes". Further, suppose there exists a one-to-one function g from S to S such that, for all ,
and [
Suppose two decision problems S and S have the same number of states of the world.
Duality then requires that, if the ranking of outcomes from two actions a and b in decision problem S is the "reverse" of the ranking of the outcomes of two actions a and b in the decision problem S , then the ranking of a and b must be the "reverse" of the ranking of a and b .
In the following two decision problems S and S such that 11 ( ), 
We assume that (1) holds for the rest of our discussion. 
